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Gains from productivity and knowledge transmission arising from the presence of foreign firms have
received a good deal of empirical attention, but theoretical micro-foundations for this mechanism are
limited.  Here we develop a dynamic model in which foreign experts may train domestic workers who
work with them.  Gains from training can in turn be decomposed into two types: (a) obtaining knowledge
and skills at a lower cost than if they were self-learnt at home, (b) producing domestic skilled workers
earlier in time than if the domestic economy had to rediscover the relevant knowledge through "reinventing
the wheel."  We use fixed effects and nearest neighbour matching estimators on a panel of plant-level
data for Colombia that identifies the use of foreign experts, to show that these experts have substantial,














There now exists a well-developed empirical literature on the transmission of 
technical/managerial knowledge and productivity “spillovers” between countries and whether 
trade or investment is a more important channel of transmission (Keller 1998, 2002ab, Haskel 
and Slaughter 2002, Gong and Keller 2003, Javorcik and Spatareanu 2003 and Javorcik 2004). 
In the latter vein of literature, several different ideas for the micro-foundations of the 
transmission mechanism have been proposed or modelled. Theoretical models have looked at 
linkages as a source of productivity spillovers, so that upstream and/or downstream firms benefit 
from the arrival of multinationals (Markusen and Venables, 1999). This has generally been in the 
form of variety effects from supporting an increased number of intermediate or final goods. 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996), for example, develops a model of how the multinationals can improve 
welfare by generating more linkages compared to the linkages that would be generated by the 
domestic firms they displace from the labor market. The second stream of theoretical analysis 
looks at workers or local firms learning from watching or working for foreign firms with a 
resulting increase in their productivity (Ethier and Markusen 1996, Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde 
2001, Markusen 2001, Glass and Saggi 2002). Empirical work in search of spillovers to local 
firms include Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aiken and Harrison and Lipsey (1996), Blomström 
and Kokko (1998), Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Blalock (2002), 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003) and Javorcik (2004). Other empirical literature has documented 
that local firms and their managers often get their start as employees of multinational firms (Katz 
1987, Hobday 1995, Hall and Khan 2003). 
Very little in this literature is directed at modelling the precise micro-mechanism of how 
foreign skilled workers impart those skills to domestic workers. To close this gap is the purpose 
of our paper. We focus on direct imports of the services of foreign experts as a method of both   3
providing an important good or service and for training domestic workers faster and/or cheaper 
than they can learn on their own. We depart from the tradition of comparative steady-state 
analysis used in new growth theory, since we want to explicitly consider timing issues rather than 
merely steady-state levels and growth rates. For this reason, we use a very simple competitive 
constant-returns model with no spillovers, externalities, or other bells-and-whistles.  
Firms and workers are initially identical in the model in period 1.  In period 2, any/all 
firms can choose to hire foreign experts for one period.  Due to the general-equilibrium structure 
of the model, there are ranges of parameters for which some firms do and some do not hire 
foreign experts.   Workers in firms hiring foreign experts have a higher productivity in period 2 
and (generally) in period 3.  In period 4, productivity in firms not hiring foreign experts catches 
up to those that do. 
The model solves for the wage profiles of workers in firms that use foreign experts and 
those that do not as a basis for our empirical section.  In general, the model predicts that workers 
in firms with foreign experts should accept lower wages in period 2 in exchange for higher wages 
in period 3.  However, if there are perfect spillovers to the other firms or if foreigners are just 
used to substitute for scarce skilled workers in period 2, this effect is not present; that is, there is 
no observed effect of foreign experts on the wages of those in firms with versus without foreign 
experts. 
Our empirical section uses Colombian Manufacturing Surveys (1977-1991), where the use 
of foreign experts is identified in each period (if any) for each plant.  The surveys contain a 
sample of 304 plants for which we observe three distinct stages – before employing any foreign 
experts, while foreign experts remain with the plant, and after they leave – and this information 
allows us to evaluate contemporaneous and posterior impact of the experts on the wages of 
skilled and unskilled workers and labor productivity.  We find the impact to be large and positive   4
(although not always immediate).  However, the longer the plant postpones the decision to hire 
foreign experts, the smaller is the experts’ contribution to the increased wages or productivity. 
Perhaps the most important challenge to our analysis is that the decision to hire a foreign 
expert is non-random, and the factors that enter into this decision are likely to have an element of 
personal choice on behalf of the plant’s manager and are not directly observable.  Plant fixed-
effects and nearest neighbor matching estimators are used to overcome this problem.  In the 
former we include plant fixed effects to remove the impact of any time-invariant characteristics 
and find that the use of foreign experts increases the wages of skilled workers and value added 
per worker by about 11 percent in the post-expert period.  In the latter we use a number of 
observable plant characteristics to pair the plants employing foreign experts with similar plants 
who don’t and find that the use of foreign experts raises wages of unskilled and skilled workers 
by 5 and 6 percent respectively in the post-expert period.  The impact on the value added per 
worker is approximately 8 percent and is present in both contemporaneous and post-expert 
periods.   5
2.   The four-period model 
Our model is a competitive, perfect-foresight Arrow-Debreu style general-equilibrium model. 
There are four time periods, which deserves some comment. The first period is to establish a 
“before” wage for skilled workers. Foreign experts can be used in the second period. Two “after” 
periods are used in order to focus on the timing effects of using foreign experts. Workers in firms 
that use foreign experts at t = 2 get a productivity boost in period 3, while workers that don’t 
catch up to the former in period 4
1. The following outlines the model. 
(a) There are four time periods 
(b) There are two goods, X and Y; both sectors competitive, constant returns to scale 
(c) There are two factors, R and a (initially) homogeneous supply of unskilled labor L 
(d) Y is produced from a sector-specific factor R and unskilled labor L 
(e) X is produced using labor that grows in productivity over time through learning-by-doing. 
X is non-traded. 
(f)  Foreign experts may also be used in X production in period 2 working with domestic 
labor in fixed proportions. 
(g) Learning by X sector workers is embodied in the workers and is sector specific.  
Let subscript t denote time period. Yt is produced from Rt , and Lt : 
) , ( yt t t L R Y Y =  (1) 
The role of R is to add convexity to the model: unskilled workers going to train must be drawn 
from the Y sector at increasing cost in terms of Y. 
At time t = 1, there is a once-and-for all division of the homogeneous labor supply L1 into 
Y sector workers and X sector workers. With homogeneity and perfect foresight, all workers earn 
the same present value of wages over the four time periods. 
                                                 
1 “Firms” are not well defined in such a model, but we will use that term rather than talk about production activities, 
which would probably be more elegant.   6
x y L L L + = 1  (2) 
In period 1, X sector workers produce output according to the simple relationship 
x L X 1 1 π =  (3) 
where π is a measure of productivity. At t = 2, there can exist either or both of two firm types 
(more correctly, there are two production activities), one that uses only domestic workers (type-d) 
and one that uses foreign experts, F, (type-f) working with domestic workers, where the total 
number of domestic workers is the number given by Lx in (2) and (3). 
d d d L X 2 2 π =        [ ] F L X f f f α π , min 2 2 =       f d x L L L + =       2 2 f d π π <  (4) 
where α is just a scaling parameter (the number of domestic workers per foreign worker) that 
plays little role in our analysis. Outputs from the two firm types are homogeneous.  
Workers who work with foreign experts may learn more, and this is then reflected in 
period 3 outputs. 
d d d L X π = 3           f f f L X 3 3 π =           3 3 f d π π ≤  (5) 
The special case where πd3 = πf3 has two interpretations. The first is that foreign experts simply 
relieve a labor shortage and allow more output to be produced at t = 2 while domestic workers 
learn by doing. There is no lasting effect on the workers who work with the foreign experts 
relative to those that don’t. They are just substitutes for scarce, or still not very productive, 
domestic workers. The second interpretation is that there is a perfect spillover of learning to 
workers in type-d firms and this cannot be internalized by market charges (in other words, we are 
defining a perfect spillover as πd3 = πf3 if type-f firms are present, πd3 < πf3 if they are not.  More 
on this later.   7
It seems cheap to just assume that foreign experts have a permanent effect on the domestic 
workers they are paired with, so we assume that all X sector workers have the same productivity 
in period 4. 
d d d L X 4 4 π =               f f f L X 4 4 π =                4 4 f d π π =    (6) 
This assumes that the domestic workers would eventually have figured out which nob to turn. 
Foreign experts allow more or cheaper X production early on (πd2 < πf2), and quicken the 
learning process of domestic workers if πd3 < πf3 or if there are spillovers.  
Foreign experts can be hired for a fixed price pfr in terms of good Y (X is non-traded as 
noted earlier). In a partial-equilibrium model with fixed factor prices, only one of the two 
activities to produce X at t = 2 in (4) would be active: either all domestic workers would work 
with a foreign expert or no foreign experts would be hired. But in our general-equilibrium model, 
hiring foreign experts is increasing costly in terms of foregone consumption, and so there are a 
range of values of pfr, given values of other parameters, such that there can co-exist both type-d 
and type-f firms in period 2. We are going to concentrate on this range, since it provides an 
interesting comparison of the wage paths of workers in the type-d and type-f firms. 
Finally, we assume a positive rate of time preference in consumption, equal to a world 
rate of interest. The country can pay for its foreign experts at t = 2 by selling Y in any period, 
borrowing or lending at this interest rate. We have run the model assuming experts must be paid 
with Y2 (no international borrowing or lending), and found that this makes no qualitative 
difference. 
While the model seems conceptually simple, it involves a large number of dimensions: 
inequalities/equations and unknowns. Secondly, which relationships hold with equality and 
which are slack is determined in equilibrium. Together these two features make many of the 
analytical tools of traditional comparative-statics analysis of little value. Thus we will solve the   8
model numerically. Each weak inequality is associated with a complementary non-negative 
variable, so the model is formally called a non-linear complementarity problem. 
The model conceptually decomposes into three sets of relationships: 
(a) Zero-profit inequalities for all production activities, including the “production” of utility 
from inputs of X and Y; complementary variables are activity levels (quantities).  
(b) Market-clearing inequalities for all “commodities”, which is a general name for goods, 
factor, and utility (utility is modeled as produced and then purchased by the representative 
consumer). “Foreign exchange” is a commodity that is earned by exporting Y in one or 
more periods and is used to buy experts. 
(c) An income-balance equation for the representative consumer. 
The entire model is 56 weak inequalities in 56 unknowns. This is presented in the next section 
which can be skimmed or even skipped with (we hope) little loss of continuity.    9
3.   The full model: inequalities and unknowns (may be skipped) 
Notation is as follows, where prices are measured in real or utility terms (numeraire is the price 
of buying one unit of intertemporal utility: 
Yi , pyi    quantity and price of good Y at time t = i   
Ri , pri    quantity and price of Y-sector-specific factor R at time t = i 
L1 , pl1     quantity and asset price (not rental price) of unskilled labor L at time t = 1
2 
Ui , pui     quantity and (rental) price of unskilled labor U at time t = i 
S1 , ps1     quantity and (rental) price of X sector (skilled) labor S at time t = 1 
Sdi , pdi   quantity and (rental) price of X sector (skilled) labor S at time t = i who do not 
work with foreign experts at t = 2 (i = 2,3,4) 
Sfi , pfi   quantity and (rental) price of X sector (skilled) labor S at time t = i who work with 
foreign experts at t = 2 (i = 2,3,4) 
F , pfr    quantity and price of foreign experts F at time t = 2 
Ei , pe   quantity of “foreign exchange” at time t = i, price of foreign exchange at t=1. 
X1 , pxi   quantity and price of good X at time t = i 
Xdi , pxi   quantity and price of good X at time t = i (i=2,3,4) produced by workers who have 
not worked with foreign experts 
Xf1 , pxi   quantity and price of good X at time t = i (i=2.3.4) produced by workers who are 
working with or have worked with foreign experts 
Factors Ri and L1 are fixed quantities. E is an artificial good: Y can be exchanged 
(exported) for E and E can then be exchanged for imported foreign experts F. With borrowing 
and lending allowed, E carries no subscript and thus exports of Y in any period can be exchanged 
for foreign experts in any period at the world interest rate, denoted ρ. 
                                                 
2 Analogous to the price of a unit of capital, p11 is the present value at t=1 of a unit of unskilled labor.  
  pui, following line, is the single period rental price of unskilled labor at t=i.   10
A key parameter in the model is cost, which is the number of units of Y that must be 
exchanged for one for expert. Higher levels of cost are bad. 
Convexity in the model comes from the fixed factor R in the Y sector, which is assumed 
Cobb-Douglas in the simulations: labor is drawn into training and X production at increasing cost 
in terms of Y, with cyi(pui, pri) denoting the unit cost function for Yi. 
Utility or welfare is treated as a produced good. The flow of utility in period i and the 
price of obtaining a unit of utility is 
Wi , pwi     quantity and price of welfare at t = i 
W, pw      quantity and price of intertemporal utility 
The price of utility in period i and overall are given by standard cost or unit expenditure 
functions, denoted cwi(pyi, pxi) and cw(pw1, pw2, pw3, pw4) respectively. A CES with an elasticity of 
substitution greater than one is assumed in these functions (a value of 2 is used in the simulations 
within and between periods) and future consumption is discounted at rate ρ. 
Here is the full model. Commodity and factor demands are found by the application of 
Shepard’s lemma to cost and expenditure functions. 
Zero-profit Inequality     Complementary   Description  
     v a r i a b l e  
yi ri ui yi p p p c ≥ ) , (     i Y    Production  activity  Yi 
4 3 2 1 1 u u u u l p p p p p + + + ≥    U     Unskilled labor supply to Yi 
4 3 2 1 1 d d d s l p p p p p + + + ≥    d S     Unskilled labor supply to X 
(working without foreign experts) 
4 3 2 1 1 d d d s l p p p p p + + + ≥    f S     Unskilled labor supply to X 
(working with foreign experts)   11
1 1 1 x s p p π ≥       1 X    X 1 production 
xi di di p p π ≥       di X     Production activity for Xdi (i = 2,3,4) 
2 2 2 x f fr f p p p π ≥ +      2 f X     Production activity for Xf2 
1 x fi fi p p π ≥       fi X     Production activity for Xfi (i = 3,4) 
f e p p ≥ cost *   F     Imports of experts at t = 2 
e
i
yi p p ≥ +
− 2 ) 1 ( * ρ      i EY     Exports of Y at t = i 
wi xi yi wi p p p c ≥ ) , (     i W    Sub-welfare at t = i 
w w w w w w p p p p p c ≥ ) , , , ( 4 3 2 1    W    Total (present value) of welfare 
The next set of inequalities are market clearing conditions for each of the goods, factors, 
and trade activities. The complementary variables are prices of these quantity variables. 
Inequalities are written as supply greater than or equal to demand, where a strictly greater-than 
relationship implies that the price is zero (a free good) in equilibrium. Demands for goods/factors 
exploit Shephard’s lemma in activities Yi and Wi where there is variable substitution among 
inputs. 
Market-clearing inequality   Complementary    Description 





























≥      ri p       Supply - demand for Ri 
f d S S U L + + ≥ 1    1 l p       Supply - demand for L1   12
1 1 /π X S S f d ≥ +    1 s p       Supply - demand for S1 
di di d X S π / ≥      di p       Supply - demand for SD2 (i=2,3,4) 
fi fi f X S π / ≥      fi p       Supply - demand for SFi (i=2,3,4) 































≥      wi p       Supply - demand for Wi 
w p I W / ≥      w p       Supply - demand for W 
F EY
i
i * cost ) 1 (
2 ≥ + ∑
+ − ρ   e p       Supply - demand for forgn. exchange 
Income balance equation   Complementary Description 
    V a r i a b l e  
∑ + = i ri l R p L p I 1 1    I       Income balance, rep consumer 
In all, the model then consists of 53 inequalities in 53 unknowns. One equation is 
redundant by Walras’ Law, so the price of a unit of welfare, pw is used as numeraire and the 
corresponding equation is dropped from the model. The model is coded in Rutherford’s MPS/GE, 
a subsystem of GAMS and solve using the non-linear complementarity solver in GAMS.   13
4.   Results 
We have run countless simulations of the model, altering the basic structure and parameter values 
to see what qualitative and quantitative conclusions emerge. We will present a very sparse set of 
outcomes here, but we feel that these are generally representative and robust to wide ranges in 
parameter values and to minor changes in model specification. 
We do concentrate on parameter values such that the solution to the model has both typed 
and type-f firms active in equilibrium. This puts some restrictions on the π’s and on the cost 
parameter, where cost is the amount of Y that must be exchanged for a foreign expert as 
discussed in the previous section.  For higher values of cost, for example, only type-d firms 
operate in equilibrium and only type-f for much lower values. The following are the productivity 
parameters for our first simulation. 
π1 = 0.5   π d2 = 0.7   π d3 = 0.8   π d4 = 1.2 
π 1 = 0.5   π f2 = 1.0   π f3 = 1.0   π f4 = 1.2 
These are rather arbitrary indeed. Given equal productivities at t = 1 and t = 4, many 
simulations show that the important feature of this is that π d3 < π f3 . Workers who worked with 
foreign experts at t = 2 have an advantage over workers who didn’t at t = 3. This is very 
important in determining the qualitative nature of the solution, as we shall see. Productivity 
differences at t = 2 are not so important.  
Figures 1 and 2 give a solution to this model for a value of cost that supports both firm 
types in equilibrium. Figure 1 shows the time path of wages for unskilled Y-sector workers (PU), 
X sector workers in type-d firms (PD) and X sector workers in type-f firms (PF). Given the 
competitive assumptions of the model and the initial homogeneity of labor, all workers earn the 
same present value of earnings over the four time periods. Type-d and type-f workers have the 
same productivity in period 4, type-d workers “catch up”, so they must have the same   14
competitive wage at t = 4 as shown. Type-f workers have a higher productivity at t = 3, and hence 
they earn more than type-d workers at t = 3. This in turn is compensated for by workers in type-f 
firms having to accept a lower wage at t = 2. Both types of X-sector workers earn less in periods 
1 and 2 than Y-sector workers in compensation for higher earnings later on. 
Figure 1 offers several empirical predictions about what we might see in the data. Most 
useful is the comparison between the firms that use foreign experts and those that don’t (recall 
that all firms are ex ante identical in our model, so by assumption there is no firm-level 
heterogeneity).
3 We observe before, during and after periods for the foreign experts in Figure 1, 
just as we can in our empirical section to follow. One result from Figure 1 is that wages in the 
“during” period t = 2 are predicted to be lower for firms that use foreign experts, in compensation 
for building the human capital of the workers later. Second, wages are predicted to be higher in 
the “after” period t = 3 in the firms that use foreign experts. We will test these predictions in our 
empirical section. 
Figure 2 shows real consumption profiles for our simulated economy, and then also 
computes the profile with no foreign experts allowed. Here we see that the use of foreign experts 
allows higher consumption in periods 2 and 3, the “learning on the quick” idea in terms of 
consumption. Gains from trade are taken in the form of higher consumption in earlier periods. 
It is interesting and important to note, that the no-experts results in Figure 2 also occurs if 
we switch the assumptions to allow for perfect spillovers to the firms that do not use foreign 
experts. This is computed by raising π d3 from 0.8 to π d3 = 1.0 = π f3 if foreign experts are used 
(type-f firms are active) but holding it at 0.8 otherwise. The effect of this, for the value of cost 
and other parameters used, is that it is not profitable for type-f firms to enter, and thus the 
existence of the spillovers blocks the beneficial effects that foreign experts might bring. It is often 
                                                 
3 We shall relax the assumption of homogeneous firms in our empirical analyses.   15
forgotten in discussions about the beneficial effects of spillovers that these are market failures, 
and the inability to internalize this positive externality can mean that the economy is worse off. 
That is precisely what happens in this particular case: the lack of “property rights” prevents the 
use of foreign experts and their beneficial effect is lost. 
Figures 3 and 4 compute a second interesting case by raising the value of π d3 to 1.0 as just 
considered but by also lowering cost so that foreign experts will be used. Productivity parameters 
are now: 
π 1 = 0.5   π d2 = 0.7   π d3 = 1.0   π d4 = 1.2 
π 1 = 0.5   π f2 = 1.0   π f3 = 1.0   π f4 = 1.2 
As suggested above, this case has two interpretations. First, the foreign experts just have a 
temporary effect, they are like having additional workers around in an environment where skilled 
workers are scarce. Once they go, productivity returns to the same level for all skilled workers. 
Second, there is a perfect spillover to workers who have not worked with foreign experts in 
period 3 (but caution, π d3 = 1.0 if foreign experts are present in period 2, it is 0.8 otherwise). 
With the lower value of cost relative to that in Figures 1-2, foreign experts are used in the 
simulation of Figures 3-4. The wage path shown in Figure 3 is interesting and important. The 
wage profile is identical for workers in both type-f and type-d firms. In general equilibrium, 
wages for both types of skilled workers must be the same in periods 1,3,4, and so must be the 
same in period 2 as well. The difference in productivity between the type-d and type-f workers at 
t = 2 is exactly the payment to the foreign experts when both firm types exist in equilibrium. 
The importance of this result lies in its implications for empirical work that tries to 
discern the productivity benefits from foreign experts by comparing firms that do and do not use 
these experts. In the present case, we would detect no difference in the data, yet under the 
spillovers interpretation, the economy is certainly getting a productivity boost from the foreign   16
experts. Somewhat ironically, the existence of spillovers may prevent the researcher from 
discovering the benefits of foreign workers. 
Figure 4 presents three consumption profiles. The one denoted “equilibrium” corresponds 
to the results in Figure 3. Then we assume that this is a case of perfect spillovers, and compute 
the counterfactual of no spillovers, lowering π d3 to 0.8 regardless of whether or not foreign 
experts are present. The difference between these two is interesting and instructive. The 
elimination of spillovers leads to more foreign experts being hired at t = 2, and so consumption is 
higher at t= 2 without spillovers. As emphasized above, the existence of non-internalized positive 
externality may mean less, not more, following the general-equilibrium response of firms. But the 
productivity gained by workers in type-d firms in period 3 leads to a higher consumption level 
with spillovers at t = 3 and t = 4. The overall effect on intertemporal welfare is slightly higher 
with spillovers in this case (not shown), but we cannot feel confident that this is a general result, 
and such a general result is certainly not suggested by general theory (recall in the previous 
simulation that introducing spillovers unambiguously decrease welfare). 
The dashed line in Figure 4 plots the consumption profile when foreign experts are 
banned. Unlike the case of Figure 2, this is not the same as that with spillovers, since in the 
present case foreign experts are used in spite of the spillover. This curve “no F” is identical to 
that in Figure 2, and is reproduced just for comparison. Again, we see that the effect of foreign 
experts is to increase consumption in the middle periods, raising welfare quicker than without 
their services. 
Before continuing, we might note that there are surely institutional constraints which may 
lead to difference wage paths even if our model is an otherwise good representation of reality. In 
particular, it may not be possible for firms to pay (competitive equilibrium) low wages in early 
periods in exchange for higher ones later. There are all sorts of reasons why this could be true,   17
ranging from minimum wages, to industry-wide wage setting (requiring common wages in typed 
and type-f firms) to an imperfect ability to predict future productivity, and so forth.  
Of course, in a world of complete and enforceable contracts, this is not a problem: higher 
earlier wages may be absorbed by lower later wages relative to the paths shown in Figures 1 and 
3. Note that in our model, type-f workers are indifferent between either the PD or PF wage 
profiles. While this is fine in theory, it will of course confound the empirical analysis since, as in 
the case of Figure 3, there will be little measurable difference between workers in type-f and 
type-d firms. This could be wrongly interpreted as the foreign experts having no effect. 
As a point of theory, having to pay higher wages early on in exchange for lower wages 
later leads to precisely the type of hold-up problem in later periods that has been the subject of 
much interest in the offshoring/outsourcing literature (see for example Ethier and Markusen 
(1996), Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde (2001), Markusen (2001), Antrás (2002, 2003), and Glass and 
Saggi (2002)). While this is a very interesting issue, it is unfortunately beyond the scope of the 
present paper. But the empirical caveat of the previous paragraph must be noted.  
With the results of Figures 1 and 3 in mind, we now turn to an empirical analysis. 
 
5. Empirical  Analysis 
Our theory model is primarily focused on the timing of learning and productivity increases, since 
firms go to the same productivity values in the long-run regardless of whether or not foreign 
experts are used.  The latter allow the accumulation of skills cheaper and especially earlier.  This 
is not an easy thing to test empirically, at least with available data that we are aware of.  Further, 
the competitive labor-market assumption means that all workers share in the benefits, not just 
those who work directly with the foreign experts.   18
  We are able to test the hypothesis that foreign experts visiting local plants share their 
knowledge and improve the plant’s productivity.  As a data source we employ plant level data 
from the the Annual Manufacturing Survey (1977 – 1991) collected by Colombia’s 
Departamento Administrative Nacional de Estadistica (DANE).  AMS data covers all 
establishments employing ten or more workers and, among other things, reports values of 
production, domestic and foreign sales, imported and domestically purchased intermediate inputs, 
wage bills by skill category, capital stocks, ownership, taxes and subsidies.  Roberts and Tybout 
(1996) provide a more comprehensive description of the data.  There are several advantages using 
these data.  First, the plants report directly the number of foreign experts employed in a given 
period.  Secondly, the panel nature of the data allows us to discern the within-plant changes in 
productivity resulting from the assistance from foreign experts.  Thirdly, these statistics can be 
supplemented by the interviews of the plant managers covering the same time frame to provide 
more detail on the learning process (Morawetz, 1981; Berry and Escandon, 1994). 
  We start by comparing the profiles of 715 plants who report having employed foreign 
experts at least once during the period in question with the plants who have never done so.  To 
these means, we run a series of regressions, in which plant characteristics are regressed on the 
dummy variable indicating whether the plant has employed any foreign experts during at least 
one period over the 1977-1991 span, plant size and a set of industry, year and region fixed 
effects.  The findings from these regressions are presented in Table 1.  The reported coefficients 
can be interpreted as percentage difference between the two types of plants.    Irrespective of 
whether size is added as an additional covariate, the firms opting for the help from foreign expert 
are more capital and skilled labor intensive, import a higher share of raw materials, and export a 
higher share of their output.  Their workers are more productive (measured by value added per 
worker or sales per worker) and are better paid irrespective of the skill level.     19
To truly exploit the panel nature of the data, for the rest of the analysis we restrict our 
sample to 304 plants, which we observe during three distinct stages – before employing any 
foreign experts, while foreign experts remain with the plant and after they leave.   
To discern how foreign experts affect productivity, we estimate variations of the following wage 
equation: 
(1)  ijkt k t j ijkt ijkt ijkt ijkt Area Time Ind Z After During w ε δ α α α + + + + + + + = 2 1 0 ) ln(  
The subscripts i, j, k, and t denote plant, industry, region and time.  Our dependent 
variable is the natural logarithms of real wages for skilled and unskilled workers.  We have 
selected these variables on the supposition that wages are sufficiently correlated with the 
workers’ marginal productivity.  In fact, Verner (1999) finds that wages do not keep pace with 
productivity gains, a finding that suggests that, if anything, we underestimate the effect of foreign 
experts on the productivity of local workers.  However, we also repeat the analysis using value 
added per worker as the measure of worker productivity (see Cahuc et al. (2002) for discussion 
against the use of output per worker).   
Our main independent variables are indicators for whether the plant is currently 
employing foreign experts (“During”) or has employed them in the past (“After”).  The omitted 
category is the period prior to the employment of foreign experts.  The coefficient on the variable 
“During” can be potentially interpreted as the immediate impact of experts on productivity, since 
more than half of the plants report only one period in which they employ a foreign expert. 
Drawing on the literature on firm-level determinants of wages, our vector of additional 
controls, Z, includes total labor force, skill intensity, capital intensity, share of imported raw 
materials (on the assumption that plants investing in imported and better quality raw materials are 
also the ones seeking out higher quality workers), and regional wages to reflect opportunity costs.  
Following the literature on rent sharing and efficiency wages, we also include plant’s market   20
share and sales per worker.  All specifications include industry, year and region fixed effects.  We 
also experiment with other covariates, such as unemployment rates (to reflect opportunity costs), 
industry protection measures, industry growth rates, and Herfindahl index of industry 
concentration (on the assumption that the increasing degree of competition may raise the effort 
level that the managers must exert to remain viable and will motivate them to turn to outside 
sources).  None of these factors is found to be important in the determination of wages or value 
added per worker in our sample.  Given a relatively small sample size, we choose a more 
parsimonious specification and do not include these variables.  To account for general forms of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term, we compute robust standard errors 
clustered by plant. 
We gather a general idea of the impact of foreign experts on domestic workers by 
considering a specification in which we control only for industry, year and region effects.  As 
shown in Table 2, the percentage increase in wages and value added per worker relative to the 
period prior to the employment of foreign experts is positive and significant.  The wages increase 
by approximately 8 percent.  This increase is immediate (as evidenced by the positive coefficient 
on the variable “During”) and is retained after the foreign experts leave.  The instantaneous 
increase in the value added per worker is a walloping 19 percent, which remains at a high 7 
percent after the expert leaves the plant.   
Apart from the coefficient on the “During” variable in the specifications with wages for 
skilled workers and value added per worker, the inclusion of additional controls does not change 
much either the magnitude or the significance level of the impact of foreign experts on 
productivity.  Table 3 shows that after the foreign expert leaves the plant, workers’ wages are 5.3-
7.3 percent and value added per worker is 8.5 percent higher than during the period prior to the 
visit by the foreign expert.     21
One may wonder whether the “intensity of the treatment” matters, i.e. whether the number 
of employed foreign experts or the time they spend at the local plant matters for the productivity 
gains.  Unfortunately, there is not much variation in the data to test the first hypothesis:  of all 
non-zero values for the number of foreign experts, 85% report only 1 expert present.  Similar 
problem arises when we look at the number of periods with non-zero values for foreign experts – 
half of the plants invite a foreign expert for only one period.   
As an alternative to using the number of periods the expert stays at the plant as a 
continuous independent variable, in panels A and B of Table 4 we report the findings from the 
analyses conducted separately for two types of plants:  those who invite an expert only once and 
those keep the experts for a longer time.  The plants that invite an expert for only one period 
experience a 12 percent jump in value added per worker.  The wages of unskilled workers 
increase by 8 percent after the expert leaves.  Such pattern appears to be consistent with the 
situation in which an expert is invited to fix (or set up) equipment or give recommendations 
regarding product design, rather than for on-going training.   
The results reported in Panel B for the subset of the plants welcoming foreign experts on a 
more consistent basis indicate that the benefits may be cumulative:  the productivity starts 
increasing while the expert is still at the plant (although we can no longer interpret this jump as 
instantaneous) but the gain is at its highest after the expert leaves.  This pattern appears to be 
consistent with the theory of on-the-job training, which requires a longer interaction period and 
generates more permanent productivity gains.           
  Perhaps the most important challenge to our empirical analysis is that the decision to hire 
a foreign expert is non-random, and the factors that enter into this decision are likely to have an 
element of personal choice on behalf of the plant’s manager and are not directly observable.  The   22
same factors may also be affecting the productivity of local workers.  Plant fixed-effects and 
nearest neighbor matching estimators are used to overcome this problem.   
In the former we include plant fixed effects to remove the impact of any time-invariant 
characteristics.  Here we rely solely on the within-plant variation to identify the effect of foreign 
experts on the productivity of various types of workers.  The inclusion of the fixed effects in 
Table 5 dampens the impact of foreign experts on all three measures of productivity.  The impact 
remains statistically significant (and surprisingly unchanged in magnitude) only in the 
specification for skilled workers.  The loss of statistical significance is not surprising given that 
the fixed effects along with year dummies absorb most of the variation in the data.  Limiting the 
sample to those plants that have employed foreign experts for longer than one period, bounces 
both the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients up to the levels observed in the OLS 
specifications.  Both value added per worker and the wages of skilled workers increase by 
approximately 11 percent after the visit by foreign experts.  The wages of both skilled and 
unskilled workers increase by approximately 3-5 percent during the visit by foreign experts, 
however this increase is not statistically significant.  The increase in the value added per worker 
during the visit by foreign experts is 8 percent and is significant at 5 percent level, which is 
perfectly consistent with the finding by other authors that wages do not keep pace with labor 
productivity gains.         
To assess the validity of our findings, we also employ propensity score matching and 
construct a counterfactual for the wages and productivity outcomes that the plant would have had, 
had it not hired any foreign experts (see Arnold and Javorcik (2005) for an application of the 
propensity score matching to the analysis of the knowledge transfer).  We do so by paring up 
each plant with foreign experts with a very similar plant employing only domestic workers based 
on a number of “pre-treatment” – i.e. “prior to employment of foreign experts” – characteristics.    23
These characteristics include the plant’s total employment, capital intensity, profitability (sales 
per worker), share of imported raw materials, market share, industry, and location.  To reduce the 
dimensionality problem when considering differences on more than one observable characteristic, 
these characteristics are summarized into a single scalar (propensity score) reflecting the 
probability of a plant to use foreign experts (the results from the logit estimation are reported in 
Table 6).  A plant without foreign experts but with a similar propensity score as a plant with 
foreign experts will then be used as the missing counterfactual.  The success of the propensity 
score matching is confirmed in Table 7, where one can see that the matched firms display 
considerable homogeneity as opposed to the stark differences we observe in the unmatched 
sample. 
In Table 8 we repeat the fixed effects estimation of the effect of foreign experts on the 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers and the value added per worker on the matched and the 
unmatched samples.  This effect, as in previous analyses, is captured by the contemporaneous 
dummy “During” and the dummy for the post-treatment period “After.”  There is a considerable 
difference in the estimation results for the whole sample and the matched sample.  The effects 
estimated based on the whole sample are almost always larger and more significant than for the 
matched sample.  This illustrates the potential problem that the estimation on the full sample 
suffers from endogeneity bias which leads to an overstatement of the causal effect of foreign 
experts on wages and productivity.  Taking the estimates in Table 8 at face value, our findings for 
the matched sample indicate that foreign experts raise wages of unskilled and skilled workers by 
5 and 6 percent respectively in the post-expert period.  The impact on the value added per worker 
by approximately 8 percent and is present in both contemporaneous and post-expert periods.  The 
matching method thus confirms our finding that the use of foreign experts exerts positive effect 
on the workers’ wages and productivity.     24
As noted earlier, our theory model is focused on the timing issue: obtaining skills earlier 
in time through the use of foreign experts. This is not easy to test, but we think that we make 
some progress using the approach shown in Table 9. The sample is again plants that have before, 
during and after periods for use of foreign experts within the sample period. The dependent 
variable is the log of post-expert wages or value added minus the log of pre-expert wages or 
value added. Two new regressors are used instead of the “during” and “after” dummies. The first 
is the “waiting time”, defined as the number of periods the plant waited before hiring an expert 
(this is time-invariant and so precludes using plant fixed effects). The second is the pre-expert 
level of the (log) of skilled wages, unskilled wages, or value added per worker corresponding the 
dependent variable. 
Results in Table 9 indicate significant, negative effects of waiting time on changes in 
wages (effects on values added per worker are economically small and statistically insignificant). 
This is at least consistent with our theory, which is that workers eventually but slowly learn on 
their own. Thus the longer the waiting time before using the foreign experts, the less is the their 
contribution to increased wages. Adding the pre-expert level of wages or value as a regressor in 
the three right-hand regressions of Table 9 cuts the effect of waiting time in half in the two wage 
regression, but it remain statistically significant at the 10% level. Since we cannot observe the 
origin/entry date of most firms (sample starts in 1977), the pre-expert level of wages may itself be 
a reasonable proxy for experience and learning accumulated up to the beginning of the sample 
period (industry and region fixed effects are used). To the extent that this interpretation is valid, 
then the negative effects of the pre-expert wage (or value added) level in all three regressions is 
again consistent with the model: if the higher initial wage or value added per worker indicates a 
higher level of earlier skill accumulation, then a negative coefficient is expected. The fact that   25
these coefficients are all less than one indicates that the higher initial wage reduces but does not 
eliminate the contribution of the foreign experts. 
Our analysis supports the general predictions of the theory that we are able to test with the 
available data.  The exception is that we do not find a negative effect on the workers’ wages 
during the period(s) in which foreign experts are present at the plant.  Recall that domestic 
workers should be willing to accept temporarily lower wages in exchange for higher ones later, 
once the training has taken place.  It is the case that in the fixed-effects (Table 5) and matching 
(Table 8) regressions, the “during” coefficients on wages are statistically insignificant and half 
the size of the “after” coefficients on skilled wages.  It is also the case that in these regressions, 
the “during” point estimates on wages are about half the size of the “during” coefficient on value 
added.   We thus feel that the estimates do not stray too far from the theoretical predictions.  As 
discussed in the theory section, minimum wage requirements, industry-wide wage setting, 
imperfect ability to predict future wages as well as trade unions may help explain the lack of 
empirical evidence for this theoretical prediction. 
Finally, the results are consistent with the version of the model in Figures 1-2 where there 
are no spillovers and where the productivity advantage persists after the experts leave.  
Alternatively, the findings are not consistent with perfects spillovers and/or a result that 
foreigners are simply “filling in” for scarce domestic workers (Figures 3-4).   26
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides theoretical micro-foundations for the mechanism of knowledge transfer, a 
phenomenon much studied empirically but lacking theoretical underpinnings.  It develops a 
dynamic model in which knowledge is transmitted through one specific channel – the foreign 
experts visiting the local plant and training its workers.  The use of foreign experts allows the 
accumulation of skills at a lower cost than if they were self-learnt at home and earlier in time than 
if the domestic economy had to rediscover the relevant knowledge through “reinventing the 
wheel.”  Our model has a number of empirical implications for the wages of skilled and unskilled 
domestic workers and their productivity, some of which we are able to test with the data from 
Colombia.  Specifically, we use fixed effects and nearest neighbour matching estimators on a 
panel of plant-level data that identifies the use of foreign experts and show that these experts 
have substantial, although not always immediate, positive effects on the wages of domestic 
workers and on the value added per worker.  We are also able to shed some light on the timing 
issue and find that the longer the plant postpones the decision to hire foreign experts, the smaller 
their contribution to the improved wage and productivity profiles.    
  By and large, the empirical results are consistent with the theory.   Although the expected 
negative “during” effect on wages is positive, it is insignificant and much smaller than the “after” 
effect as predicted.  Results are consistent with the no-spillovers version of the model, and with 
foreigners generating lasting productivity effects rather than just serving as “temporary help” 
when domestic skills are poor.     27
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  31Table 1:  Difference in Mean Characteristics Between Plants With Foreign Experts and Those Without 
Additional Controls: 3-Digit Industry, Year and Region Fixed 
Effects 
   3-Digit Industry, Year and Region Fixed 
Effects and Plant Size 
Dependent Variable:  Coeff 
Robust Std 
Error     R-squared     Coeff 
Robust Std 
Error       R-squared
log (Capital Per Worker)  0.563  0.015  *** 0.15    0.353  0.016  *** 0.18 
Exports / Total Sales  0.033  0.002  *** 0.04    0.012  0.002  *** 0.07 
Share of Imported Raw Materials 0.086  0.001  *** 0.19    0.049  0.001  *** 0.24 
log (Unskilled Workers Wage)  0.324  0.005  *** 0.24    0.134  0.005  *** 0.35 
log (Skilled Workers Wage)  0.436  0.006  *** 0.19    0.137  0.006  *** 0.39 
log (Local Technicians Wage)  0.450  0.009  *** 0.17    0.138  0.009  *** 0.37 
log (Value Added Per Worker)  0.571          0.009  *** 0.24 0.304 0.009  *** 0.30
log (Sales Per Worker)  0.501  0.010  *** 0.30    0.255  0.010  *** 0.34 
Skilled Workers / Total Labor  0.049  0.002  *** 0.21     0.023  0.002  *** 0.23 
Results from regressing plant characteristics on the dummy variable indicating whether the plant has employed any foreign experts 
during the reporting period 1977-1991 
Based on 16712 plants (92,642 observations) of which 15,997 plants (85,473 observations) have never employed foreign experts 
and 715 plants (7,169 observations) employed foreign experts in at least one reporting period.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2:  Percentage Change in Wages and Labor Productivity During the Time the Expert are Visiting the Plant and 
After They Leave Relative to the Pre-Expert Levels 
   log (Unskilled Wage)  log (Skilled Wage)  log (Value Added Per Worker) 
   Coefficient
Robust Std 
Error              







During 0.078  0.021  0.080 ***   0.027 *** 0.193  0.040 ***
After
 
      
             
               
           
                 
0.072  0.021  0.058 ***
 
  0.027  0.078 **   0.040 **
3-digit Industry Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Region Fixed Effects 
 
Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-squared 0.27 0.22 0.31
N  2921     2921     2921    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
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Table 3:  Percentage Change in Wages and Labor Productivity During the Time the Expert are Visiting the Plant and After 
They Leave Relative to the Pre-Expert Levels (Controlling for Plant Characteristics) 
  log (Unskilled Wage)  log (Skilled Wage)  log (Value Added Per Worker)
   Coefficient
Robust Std 
Error              







During 0.031  * 0.019  0.022   0.024     0.088 0.028 ***
After           
             
           
           
               
0.073  *** 0.018 0.053  ** 0.024  0.085 0.027 ***
Skilled Workers / Total Employment  0.260  0.041  *** 0.075  0.054     0.453  0.060  *** 
log(Total Labor)  0.128  0.007  *** 0.196  0.009  *** 0.034  0.010  *** 
log(Capital Per Worker)  0.036  0.006  *** 0.047  0.008  *** 0.084  0.009  *** 
log(Sales Per Worker)  0.194  0.010  *** 0.185  0.013  *** 0.655  0.014  *** 
Share of Imported Raw Materials  -0.033  0.047     0.114  0.061  *  0.294  0.069  *** 
Market Share  0.454  0.187  *** 0.714  0.243  *** 0.716  0.268  *** 
Regional Wage 
 
0.132  0.027  ***
 
0.140  0.035  ***
 
0.047  0.039    
3-digit Industry Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   




  Yes 
 
  Yes   
R-squared 0.62 0.59   0.78
N  2921     2921     2921    
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
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Table 4: The Impact of the Length of Interaction with Foreign Experts on Domestic Workers' Wages and Productivity 
















During                         0.048 0.047 0.121 ** 0.037 0.067 ** 0.071 **
  [0.034]   [0.042]   [0.053]     [0.026]   [0.034]   [0.035]  
After                         
                          
                           
                           
                          
                           
                     
                
                     
                           
                
0.081 *** 0.042 0.056 0.071 *** 0.129 *** 0.124 ***
  [0.024]   [0.030]   [0.039]     [0.029]   [0.039]   [0.040]  
Skilled Workers / Total Employment  0.194  ***  0.015     0.457  ***    0.347  ***  0.078     0.483  *** 
  [0.058]   [0.074]   [0.089]     [0.062]   [0.084]   [0.083]  
log[Total  Labor] 0.125 *** 0.183 *** 0.050 *** 0.123 *** 0.154 *** -0.003
  [0.011]   [0.014]   [0.018]     [0.010]   [0.014]   [0.013]  
log[Capital  Per  Worker] 0.051 *** 0.059 *** 0.061 *** 0.045 *** 0.047 *** 0.095 ***
  [0.009]   [0.012]   [0.014]     [0.010]   [0.013]   [0.013]  
log[Sales  Per  Worker] 0.182 *** 0.166 *** 0.631 *** 0.182 *** 0.191 *** 0.682 ***
  [0.014]   [0.017]   [0.021]     [0.015]   [0.021]   [0.021]  
Share of Imported Raw Materials  -0.041     -0.035     0.375  ***    0.029  ***  0.339  ***  0.411  *** 
  [0.070]   [0.086]   [0.109]     [0.068]   [0.091]   [0.091]  
Market  Share 0.888 *** 1.760 *** 0.319   0.029 0.564   1.243 ***
  [0.294]   [0.365]   [0.454]     [0.277]   [0.370]   [0.365]  
Regional  Wage 0.207 *** 0.216 *** 0.043   0.080 *** 0.088 *** 0.036 ***
  [0.065]   [0.080]   [0.100]     [0.030]   [0.040]   [0.039]  
3-digit  Industry,  Year  and  Region  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
         
R-squared 0.67 0.65 0.78 0.63 0.65 0.82
N 1431   1431   1431   1490   1490   1490  
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                  
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Table 5:  Impact of Foreign Experts on Domestic Workers' Wages and Poductivity, Fixed Effects Estimation 
   All    















During                0.024 0.003 0.032 0.031 0.049 0.081**
  [0.017]             
           
             
               
             
             
             
             
             
              
             
             
       
       
[0.022] [0.024] [0.024] [0.031] [0.034]
After
 
0.028 0.054** 0.009  0.035  0.111*** 0.113***
[0.019] [0.025] [0.027] [0.030] [0.039] [0.042]
log(Total  Labor)
 
-0.011 0.073*** 0.008 -0.021 0.076*** -0.024
[0.015] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.028] [0.029]
log(Capital Per Worker) 
 
0.024***  0.029***  0.051***    0.001  0.031**  0.053*** 
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015]
log(Sales Per Worker) 
 
0.184***  0.195***  0.724***    0.197***  0.189***  0.762*** 
[0.014] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.027] [0.028]
Share of Imported Raw Materials
 
-0.02  0.021  0.08    0.01  0.036  0.091 
[0.059] [0.075] [0.081] [0.090] [0.119] [0.127]
Market Share 
 
-0.199  -0.09  1.884***    0.584  0.664  2.710*** 
[0.413] [0.531] [0.589] [0.606] [0.795] [0.836]
Constant
 
2.449*** 2.398*** 0.442*** 2.550*** 2.499*** 0.449*
[0.117] [0.154] [0.159] [0.182] [0.241] [0.253]
Plant Fixed Effects 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2921 2921 2921 1490 1490 1490
Number of plant  234  232  234    110  110  110 
R-squared 0.3  0.18  0.54  0.34  0.18  0.58
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
 
  36Table 6: Determinants of Employment of Foreign Experts (Logit Estimation) 
Dependent Variable: Employment of Foreign Experts (0 - no, 1 -yes) 
    
      
      
      
      
   
      
    
    
log (Total Labor)t-1  0.716  *** 
[0.020]
log (Capital per Worker)t-1  0.241  *** 
[0.021]
log (Sales per Worker)t-1  0.199  *** 
[0.030]
Share of Imported Raw Materialst-1  0.794  *** 
[0.147]
Market Sharet-1 -1.607 ***
[0.534]
Industry Fixed Effects     
Region Fixed Effects     
Time Fixed Effects     
Number of obs   =      72,091     
        
Log likelihood = -9216.3935              
Pseudo R2       =     0.1519     
LR chi2(38)     =    3300.99     
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000       
    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Mean Values of Selected Characteristics for Matched and Unmatched Samples 
  Full Sample    Matched Sample   







 Diff Full 









log (Unskilled Worker Wage)  3.604  3.911  0.307  3.515      3.803 3.842 0.040 
log (Skilled Worker Wage)  3.886  4.250  0.364  3.766     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
4.119 4.196 0.076 
log (Value Added Per Worker)  4.573  5.183  0.610  4.431 4.970 5.079 0.109 
log (Total Labor)  3.588  4.458  0.869  3.328 4.435 4.518 0.082 
Skilled Workers / Total Employment 0.212  0.305  0.093  0.203 0.260 0.285 0.026 
log (Capital per Worker)  3.339  3.972  0.633  3.231 3.924 3.947 0.023 
log (Sales per Worker)  5.294  5.712  0.417  5.276 5.852 5.889 0.036 
Share of Imported Raw Materials  0.077  0.139  0.062  0.057 0.139 0.146 0.007 
Market Share  0.006  0.013  0.007  0.003 0.015 0.018 0.003 
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Table 8:  The Effect of Foreign Experts on Domestic Workers' Wages and Productivity (Matched and Unmatched Samples)




















During          0.041* 0.047  0.118***   0.006 0.034  0.078**
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
         
         
     
                 
[0.024] [0.035] [0.036] [0.023] [0.034] [0.035]
After 0.052** 0.053* 0.095*** 0.045* 0.062** 0.076**
[0.022] [0.027] [0.033] [0.023] [0.032] [0.035]
log(Total  Labor) 0.106*** 0.211*** 0.081*** 0.144*** 0.207*** 0.074***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.009] [0.012] [0.014]
log(Capital per Worker)  0.022***  0.006**  0.037***    0.049***  0.041***  0.088*** 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013]
log(Sales per Worker)  0.170***  0.186***  0.605***    0.201***  0.209***  0.629*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.015] [0.017] [0.024]
Share of Imported Raw Materials  0.169***  0.220***  0.416***    0.065  0.271***  0.402*** 
[0.023] [0.026] [0.031] [0.059] [0.079] [0.081]
Market Share  1.906***  1.339***  2.104***    0.642***  0.470  0.781* 
[0.300] [0.240] [0.553] [0.218] [0.303] [0.444]
Constant 1.912*** 1.797*** 0.716*** 1.534*** 1.600*** 0.468***
[0.023] [0.024] [0.029] [0.074] [0.089] [0.106]
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 87252  77359  81039   4798  4673  4404
R-squared 0.38 0.36 0.69 0.50 0.49 0.71
Robust standard errors in brackets               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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Table 9: The Impact of Postponing the Decision to Hire Foreign Experts 
  Unskilled  Skilled  VA per  Unskilled  Skilled   VA per 
                wage wage worker wage wage worker
Waiting Time Before Hiring An Expert  -0.022*** -0.037*** 0.003  -0.012*  -0.019**  -0.001 
             
  
           
           
             
           
           
             
           
             
           
             
             




Pre-Expert Level: Log(x) Pre-Expert
 
  -0.634*** -0.611*** -0.742***
[0.080] [0.077] [0.067]
Skilled workers / Total 
 
-0.117  -0.227  0.065  -0.037  -0.073  0.485*** 
[0.128] [0.152] [0.191] [0.095] [0.140] [0.150]
Log (Total Labor)  -0.009  -0.013  -0.094**  0.068***  0.113***  0.003 
[0.019] [0.027] [0.040] [0.020] [0.027] [0.032]
Log (Capital Per Worker) 
 
0.014  0.02  0.036  0.030**  0.042**  0.075*** 
[0.017] [0.027] [0.035] [0.014] [0.020] [0.029]
Log(Sales Per Worker) 
 
0.067***  0.060*  0.244***  0.166***  0.140***  0.519*** 
[0.022] [0.031] [0.047] [0.026] [0.033] [0.051]
Share Imported Raw Mat  -0.272  -0.038  0.510**  -0.188*  0.008  0.366** 
[0.170] [0.213] [0.236] [0.113] [0.147] [0.161]
Market Share 
 
0.987***  0.455  -0.334  0.710**  0.658  0.366 
[0.351] [0.556] [0.823] [0.344] [0.432] [0.692]
Regional  Wage
 
0.046 -0.028 -0.011 0.093** 0.096* 0.163**
[0.048] [0.068] [0.076] [0.040] [0.050] [0.077]
Industry/year/region  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1236 1236 1236 1236 1236 1236
R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.44 0.42 0.59
*Dependent Variable: difference in logs of post and pre-expert wages or value added per worker   
** "Waiting Time" is the number of periods the plant waited before hiring an expert; time-invariant   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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